Mark Steel is half right... nobody will abandon religion simply because an atheist bangs on about science

I generally like Mark Steel. He is usually funny and happens to take a political stance in his comedy that appeals to such as me. I was interested to read his piece in today's Independent in which he (rightly) argued nobody is going to abandon religion simply because "some atheist is banging on at them about science".

Steel is apt to recognise religious belief - as with almost any other firmly held position - is more than a mere matter of assent to facts/ideas (delete according to your predisposition). He comments, "dealing with the intricacies of people’s ideas requires more than yelling science at them" and offers the example of the anorexic who believes they are fat to underline the point. What passes as obvious for one may seem totally irrational to another specifically because of the intricacy of belief and the presumed facts each one of us deems "properly basic".

He correctly points out the issue with the modern atheist appeal to heinous acts committed by those who profess religious belief. He states: 

isn’t it the actions of these people that are vile, not the religion itself? Unless your attitude is: “Those priests are a disgrace. They sexually abused children, covered it up for decades, then to top it all they give out stupid wafers in their service. How sick can you get”?

This point rather hits at the heart of the issue. Richard Dawkins has argued the heinous acts of several atheist dictators had nothing to do with their atheism whilst simultaneously wishing to maintain the heinous acts committed by Roman Catholic priests were somehow prompted by their religion. For many of the New Atheists (cf. Christopher Hitchens' God is not great: how religion poisons everything), the attitude is precisely the one stated above.

Nevertheless, it is nice to see Steel observe "I spent a morning at a Sikh temple recently, where 4,000 free meals are provided for anyone who wants one" whilst pointedly remarking "if you turned up at Richard Dawkins’s house with 4,000 mates, I’d be surprised if you all got a meal out of him".

For all that, Steel's piece is to be commended. It is funny, endearing and recognises the truth that religious belief - in fact, belief of any sort - is more complex than simply assenting to a series of ideas. Somebody once remarked (and I forget who it was now, so I can't honestly credit it), the means by which we reach conclusions is a convoluted and intricate exercise influenced by many things. Reason is merely the device we use to convince others we are right. Often, we expect others to conclude  by reason alone when, for most of us, it is but one of many tools we use to reach conclusions.

Here, however, is where I think Steel is a little unfair. The very title of his piece presumes that the religious are scientifically deficient. Equally fallaciously, he tacitly gives rise to the view that science is the primary form of knowledge (as opposed to other areas that handle issues science cannot and upon which science is often based e.g. philosophy). For all his denunciation of Richard Dawkins, his concern is more that Dawkins patronises believers, has a problem in principle with all religion and clearly ignores the good that many religious believers do. This rather conveys the belief that atheists are the guardians of science and reason whilst believers - who should nevertheless be entertained in their fanciful views so long as they do no harm to others - are not. Steel's concern is not the specific beliefs of Richard Dawkins but the patronising and/or aggressive rhetoric he employs. It is not his views with which Steel finds a problem but the tactics Dawkins uses to convey them. Ironically, this is rather patronising.

Steel says he finds the "contradictions of religion" confusing - as well he should! The example he cites of a guru continuing to fight a battle having had his head chopped off plays directly to our Western, post-enlightenment sense of that which is "properly basic". Of course that could never happen, says Steel, but look at the good these Sikhs are doing in a community setting, offering meals to people. It's the as-long-as-they're-doing-no-harm form of patronage; "yes, their views are ridiculous but look at the lovely things they do as a result"! At least Dawkins doesn't patronise like that.

It is true that belief is a complex thing and represents more than mere assent to a set of ideas. It is also true that reason is but one of many tools we use to reach conclusions. However, that does not mean religion itself is baseless and one must park one's reason to be a believer. I equally don't believe a guru fought a battle after his head was chopped off. That's not because I simply dismiss it as something that could never happen (a position Philosophical Naturalism and Atheism are forced to hold). Rather, if there are good grounds to believe in a God (and, without rehearsing them all here, I believe there are) all sorts of possibilities are open to us. Nevertheless, I don't believe this did happen because of the positive reasons to reject it (again, all of which I will not rehearse here).

By contrast, Christianity is not a religion beget by presumption and story-telling. Scripture itself records God inviting us to "reason together" and the very basis of Christianity - the spark that ignited it as a movement - was based on the evidence for the resurrected Jesus Christ. Throughout the New Testament, the Apostles argued that their hope - and the whole basis of Christianity - stood or fell on the proof of that one fact. Establish the resurrection as a fraud (as many have tried) and Christianity dies overnight. Establish it as fact (in my view, the historical facts are extraordinarily compelling) and Christianity is based on far more than presumption. It compels us reasonably, philosophically and historically.

Where Steel is undoubtedly correct, it will take much more than atheists banging on about science to convince religious believers to abandon their beliefs. Interestingly, Christians recognised this fact long ago. Whatever the compelling reasons for Christianity (and I believe there are many), Blaise Pascal noted nearly 400 years ago, in his Pensées, that reason was but one step (and not even the first one) on the road to belief. No doubt this is where New Atheism is going wrong, merely "banging on about science", but is probably where a lot of modern evangelical Christianity gets it wrong too.

What do we do when justice fails?

The 2006 St Andrews Agreement has always been something of a tentative conclusion to the problems in Northern Ireland. Voting remains as polarised as ever - Protestants still overwhelmingly vote Unionist; Catholics still predominantly vote Republican - with the Ulster Unionists and SDLP continuing to play second fiddle to those parties once deemed (perhaps unfairly) more "radical" but certainly more virulently disposed to the aims and desires of their respective communities. The DUP, over the last 30 years, stood on a platform of being more Unionist than the Ulster Unionists and more robust in their rejection of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to great effect. Likewise, Sinn Fein have positioned themselves as greener than the SDLP. That the DUP and Sinn Fein are the majority parties within their respective communities speaks to the nature of voting cleavages in the region and the primary concerns of both the Protestant and Catholic communities.

Given all that, what are we to make of the recent revelations that secret backdoor deals, including immunity, had been given to terror suspects? Unsurprisingly, such revelations are now threatening to tear apart the already fragile St Andrews Agreement. Peter Robinson, First Minister of Northern Ireland, is threatening to resign unless there is a full judicial review into what went on. David Trimble, former Ulster Unionist leader who was central in the formation of the GFA, has stated he was unaware of such deals and reiterated that no such provision was made in the GFA to grant immunity to terror suspects. In particular, the St Andrews Agreement marked the desire of Sinn Fein to submit to the rule of law and specifically the authority of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The recent revelations of backdoor deals rather undermines the very agreement that led to power sharing in the first instance.

Sadly, this was all rather too predictable (indeed, I commented to that effect as an undergraduate student just prior to the signing of the St. Andrews Agreement). The central flaws in the power sharing arrangement were threefold: (1) The Arend Lijphart consociationalist model for Power Sharing giving the minority side a veto on any "petition of concern"; (2) As Col. Tim Collins argues, "the Good Friday Agreement was in fact a “peace at any price” deal where a militarily defeated IRA and the chaotic so-called loyalist paramilitaries were given the working-class populations of their respective communities as a blood dowry, to do with as they pleased in exchange for keeping the violence off the TV screens. The knee-cappings and beatings carried on out of sight. Only once – the brutal murder of Robert McCartney in 2005 – did the mask slip, but this was quickly covered up." St Andrews never dealt with this underlying and ongoing issue; (3) The DUP rampant rejection of the GFA was based on several factors, but one central issue was early prisoner releases. St Andrews never addressed this issue and these recent revelations were bound to reopen this old wound.

What hope of justice exists for the families of the victims of those who have been given immunity? Sadly, at the present time, not much. Unless a judicial review determines the letters granting immunity to be void (and one finds it difficult to see how they could do) terror suspects of historic crimes will remain immune. All the while, I think Tim Collins is right to feel aggrieved that "the Hyde Park murders, we are told by [Peter] Hain and others, are so far back in time that it is an outrage that anyone should be held to account. Yet he would be the first to bay for the prosecution of any soldier even vaguely associated with the event of Bloody Sunday, 10 years earlier in 1972". In the end, justice at the present time seems unlikely to be forthcoming. Expensive enquiries into the historic actions of state service men and women continue whilst equal energy is put into covering up the historic actions of terror suspects (on both sides). 

Nevertheless, none of us will escape the justice of the Lord. Whether British service men and women, Loyalist or Republican terrorist, the Lord sees all and knows what each has done. He will hold to account. For the Christian, though we may often feel like David in Psalm 73, we know that "it is appointed for man to die once, and after that comes judgement (Heb 9:27)". Likewise, "it is time for judgement to begin at the household of God; and if it begins with us, what will be the outcome for those who do not obey the gospel of God? (1 Pet 4:17)"

Whose faith prompted the healing of the paralytic man?

And behold, some people brought to him a paralytic, lying on a bed. And when Jesus saw their faith, he said to the paralytic, "Take heart, my son; your sins are forgiven." - Mt 9:2

On seeing this paralysed man, Jesus goes on to forgive his sins. But it appears on first glance there is no mention of the paralysed man's faith. The "their", whose faith Jesus saw, seems to point specifically to the man's helpers rather than to the man himself. This throws up several possible questions: does this mean the friends' faith saved the man? Was the man saved without expressing faith of his own? Did Jesus forgive the paralytic man's sin without addressing the salvation of those who brought him?

There are at least three possible solutions:

1. "Their" actually includes both the man and his friends
2. Although Jesus specifically highlights the faith of the friends, we can presume the man had some faith given he was willing to be taken to Jesus. So, "their" refers to the friends but the man must have had some faith too
3. The friends' faith was in Jesus' ability to physically heal the paralysed man. Jesus was concerned to demonstrate that forgiveness, as with healing, is entirely a work of God. Thus, Jesus forgives the paralysed man, knowing (a) his sin had been forgiven in eternity past and (b) he will exhibit saving faith upon seeing the proof his sins had been forgiven

The key drawback to option 1 is its lack of consistency with the object of the sentence. It seems apparent the friends are the object of "their", not the man. It also begs the question why Jesus pronounced the man's sins as forgiven when he already had possession of saving faith. Similarly, why was the man forgiven when his friends, whose faith Jesus saw, were not?

Option 2 appeals in several respects. It makes the friends the object of "their" whilst allowing for the man's own faith to be the basis of his forgiveness. The major drawback is that the only grounds to presume the man had faith is the forgiveness Jesus grants. We have no grounds to presume they approached Jesus with any expectation other than physical healing (and, for the paralysed man, we don't know even that). Further, if they already had saving faith, why would Jesus need to pronounce the sins of the man forgiven (a) when this was already known and (b) without pronouncing the same of his friends, whose faith prompted Jesus in the first place?

Option 3 is also appealing in several ways. It maintains the friends as the object of "their" and makes sense of the surprise that came with Jesus' pronouncement (it does appear that nobody presumed the man already forgiven). Further, this reading fits nicely with the effectual calling of Matthew immediately following. The major drawback of this reading is that it might imply some are saved without possessing saving faith. As an initial riposte, we might note (a) the ordo salutis expects a work of the Spirit prior to recognition of our own conversion and (b) if election means anything, it is that God knows in eternity past that our sin is forgiven even though we do not.

Ministries essential to the church: when no ministry might be better

What ministries and roles are so fundamentally important to the church that, were we to do away with them, it would cease to function?

Our church recently held a conference titled 'Serving without Sinking', based on the book of the same name. John Hindley, author of that book and founder of Grace Church Manchester, spoke helpfully on our motivations for serving Christ.

Many good things were said but two particularly stuck with me:

1. There are usually fewer ministries necessary for the life of the church than we think. There may be good ministry opportunities, and many excellent things to do, but Jesus managed perfectly well before they existed and doesn't insist they continue come what may
2. Perhaps it is better to have no ministry at all than one that badly reflects Christ. For example, it may be better to have no children's work than one that reflects Christ falsely through the motivations and actions of those serving

John suggested the areas of service necessary for your church to function: (1) someone to open up the building; (2) someone to preach. Other things, it was suggested, may be good and have their place but are not fundamentally essential.

If that is the case, are we better placed to strip away all extraneous areas of service - singing, children's work, etc - until there exist people whose motivations for serving Christ are right and who will, through those acts of service, properly represent Jesus? Are we best to stop certain activities until those running them serve based on their love for God and that of other believers? 

What is better: to have unsuitable individuals serving in the church - non-members, divisive individuals, those who make service about themselves, etc - or simply to have no non-essential ministries until suitable individuals are able to serve gladly, willingly and properly?

Need may be a good motivator for service but if that is our only consideration perhaps our service will do more damage to the cause of Christ.

Should we bother with debate between evolution and creationism?

The Guardian today carried a piece titled 'Bill Nye v Ken Ham: should scientists bother to debate creationism?' 

I don't wish to get into the rights and wrongs of either theory here. I am not going to spend any time defending either position. Nevertheless, I couldn't disagree more with the article.

The piece states "creationism is not science". Theistic Science, within which creationism falls, may be many things. One may wish to argue it is a false interpretation of the facts. However, to argue that it, by definition, is not science is hard to maintain. An incorrect interpretation of observable facts does not make something non-scientific. Its overall explanation may be wrong, its interpretation of the facts as we have them may be incorrect, but its interpretive stance does not, of itself, make it unscientific.

The article goes on to state creationism is "a religious belief". Again, we may want to argue, in many cases, it is motivated by religious texts and principles. We may suggest it is an interpretation of observable evidence that is filtered through a religious framework. However, to claim creationism is itself a "religious belief" is strictly untrue. Certainly, some non-scientists may accept creationism based on their own religious texts without reference to science. That would certainly be nothing more than a "religious belief". However, creationism itself is an appeal to science. We may want to argue such an appeal is entirely unjustified but that is another matter.

The writer seems perturbed, not only by the possibility of creationism being taught in science classrooms, but at the theory getting a hearing at all. Surely good science is about observing, testing, predicting and reviewing. If creationism is errant, it stands to reason that good science will win the day through such a peer review process. To simply disallow creationism, refusing it a platform lest it gain any credibility, can only be described as censorship. Science has a long history of competing models and interpretations vying for broad acceptance within the scientific community. Through careful review and better predictions coming from superior models, one theory advances above another. Rarely was censorship the answer but good scientific research leading to better predictive models.

The article argues "by standing on a stage alongside [Bill] Nye, [Ken] Ham [president of Kentucky's creation museum] appears to have a legitimate and equally opposing viewpoint to him, suggesting that evolution is somehow controversial and poorly evidenced". Well, there is no denying evolution is controversial (and it is hardly controversial to accept that point). This has absolutely no bearing on its validity but is a brute fact evidence by the article itself and the plethora of books dedicated to the subject from both sides. 

However, giving a platform to a creationist does not suggests evolution is poorly evidenced merely by virtue of their standing next to each other. What will call into question a poor theory is the weight of argument provided by both sides. If evolution is found to be overwhelmingly convincing, and creationism flounders under the challenge, it strikes me evolution is strengthened, rather than weakened, by such an exchange. If the concern is that creationism may prove to be more convincing, it strikes me as thoroughly bad science to censor its place in a debate simply because it may prove more compelling on the evidence. In truth, the platform offers no credibility to a credulous view.

Like it or not, there are scientists in respected academic institutions who accept creationism (many more than just Prof. Stuart Burgess). Of course, there is no doubting creationism is a minority view. Nevertheless, such men and women are making scientific advances, in a variety of fields, alongside their evolutionist counterparts. To censor the view, and remove it from scientific debate, ill behooves science itself. If creationism is a theory destined to be disproved, then each scientific advance will disprove it beyond doubt. If it is a theory of value, then it is nothing short of scandalous that some are seeking its censorship.

No historian fears the holocaust denier because the view is so patently errant. Were the outcome not so emotionally charged and culturally sensitive, I am sure such debates would take place and holocaust denial would be clearly and openly shown to be the hollow lie it so evidently is. If such is so clearly the case using the historical method, on which a greater number of facts can be questioned on subjective grounds, how much more will the scientific method - in which  observable phenomena are largely agreed upon by competing theories; debate centering around interpretation - show up absurdity and false evidence. 

The bottom line is this: what does the truth have to fear from evidence-based research and debate?